DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 284 303	CS 505 608
AUTHOR	Corder, Lloyd E.
TITLE	Nonverbal Expectancy Effects in the Political Media.
PUB DATE	May 87
NOTE	23p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Eastern Communication Association (78th, Syracus;, NY, May 18-21, 1987).
PUB TYPE	Speeches/Conference Papers (150) Viewpoints (120)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	*Attitude Measures; Communication (Thought Transfer); *Mass Media Effects; *Nonverbal Communication; *Political Influences; *Public Opinion; Stereotypes; Television Research
IDENTIFIERS	*Expectancy Theory; Political Communication; Political Image; Poll (Influence); Television Role

#### ABSTRACT

Expectancy effects--the unconscious shaping of receiver behavior by signalling sender expectations--while recognized in science, have not been documented extensively from a communication perspective, nor are nonverbal aspects of expectancy effects fully known. Expectancy is a function of three elements, the sender's predisposition (including stereotypes), reinforcement (including nonverbal rewards and punishments), and correspondence bias (where the sender assumes that the receiver's behavior confirms the sender's expectations). Expectancies can be observed in the following instances of media politics: (1) when voters project stereotypical idealizations of the candidates, which are fulfilled when the televised candidate generates nonverbal actions congruent with these expectations (e.g. the public desire or expectation of a folksy president is answered by Carter washing his socks in a motel room); (2) when politicians reinforce a preconception held by the public, (e.g., by acting on the belief that public opinion is more important than policy, thereby increasing the importance of the public opinion variable); or (3) when pollsters, by having an expectation of what a correct answer should be, word their questions or send nonverbal cues in ways that signal the proper response to questions. These examples show that nonverbal variables seem to have a significant impact on generating stereotypes (which results in a false disposition), and nonverbal variables also play a key role in the reinforcement step of expectancies. Appendixes include an outline of strategies for control of experimenter expectancy effects and procedures for generating experimenter expectancies. (JG)

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## NONVERBAL EXPECTANCY EFFECTS IN THE POLITICAL MEDIA

LLOYD E. CORDER

DEPARTMENT OF RHETORIC AND COMMUNICATION UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 1117 CATHEDRAL OF LEARNING PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 15260 16 May 1987

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## **1 ABSTRACT**

When a receiver of a message adopts a behavior that was unwittingly signaled by a sender, this is called an expectancy effect. Suggested behaviors are usually signaled nonverbally and below the awareness of the sender. In addition, the sender's predisposition is often reinforced and the receiver's actions are considered independent of situational variables. With these ideas in mind, this paper attempts to explain the expectancy process and show how expectancies have an impact on the political media.



## **2 INTRODUCTION**

The year was 1890:

A new tabulating machine had just been installed at the U. S. Census Bureau in Washington, D.C. In order to use the machine the bureau's staff had to learn a new set of skills that the machine's inventor believed to be quite difficult. He told the clerks that after some practice they could expect to punch about 550 cards per day: to process any more would jeopardize their psychological well-being. Sure enough, after two weeks the clerks were processing the anticipated number of cards, and reported feelings of stress if they attempted to move any faster.

Some time later an additional group of clerks was hired to operate the same machines. These workers knew nothing of the devices, and no one had told them about the upper limit of production. After only three days the new employees were punching over 2,000 cards per day with no ill effects.<sup>1</sup>

### Fourteen years later:

It was reported that in Berlin the retired schoolteacher Wilhelm von Osten had succeeded in producing evidence that animals--for the time being, horses-could think, talk, and calculate if instructed by the right method. The method invented by Herr von Osten consisted of giving a number to each letter of the alphabet. This association between letter and number the horse had to learn by means of a blackboard.

By tapping the right number with a front hoof on a board mounted in front of him, the horse could combine letters into words, words into sentences and so express his thoughts. Through this tapping method the front leg of the horse became a kind of a speaking organ. For each correct answer the horse was awarded with a delicacy.<sup>2</sup>

These two stories begin to demonstrate the power of expectancy effects, which have traditionally been labeled as the "pygmalion effect" or "self-fulfilling prophecies." The pygmalion effect occurs when we unconsciously "shape other people's behavior by signaling

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Hediger, H., "The Clever Hans Phenomenon From an Animal Psychologist' Point of View," in <u>The Clever Hans</u> <u>Phenomenon: Communication with Horses, Whales, Apes, and People</u>, Eds. Sebeok, T., and Rosenthal, R., The New York Academy of Sciences, New York, 1981, p. 1.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A Jler, R., Rosenfeld, L. Towne, N., <u>Interplay: The Process of Interpersonal Communication</u>, Second Edition, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1983, p. 46-47.

our expectations."<sup>3</sup> In a related way, "a self- fulfilling prophecy occurs when a person's expectations of an event make the outcome more likely to happen than would otherwise have been true."<sup>4</sup> More specifically, Robert Merton states.

The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true. The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. For the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very beginning.<sup>5</sup>

In the story about the tabulation machines, the first group of workers believed that they were capable of punching only 550 cards per day, and behaved accordingly. The second group of clerks did not have a false predisposition to the machines, so behaved more productively. In the second story, von Osten, without words, told his horse, Clever Hans, when to stop tapping his foot, because Clever Hans could detect a head or body movement of one millimeter. Therefore, Clever Hans knew when the experimenter wanted him to stop tapping his hoof---even though the experimenter did not realize that he was sending these signals.

Other reports of expectancy effects can be in medical and social scientific research. It has been suggested that the impact of these effects can cause a medical patient to recover more quickly or bias a social scientific experiment (e.g., when the subjects adopt a signal that was unwittingly sent by the experimenter.)<sup>6</sup> However, the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Burgoon, J., Saine, T., <u>The Unspoken Dialogue: An Introduction to Nonverbal Communication</u>. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1987, p. 296.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., <u>Interplay</u>, p. 44.

<sup>5</sup> Merton, R., Antioch Revew. 8, 193, 1948, p. 195.

<sup>6</sup> Rosenthal, R., and Rosnow, R. <u>artifact in Behavioral Research</u>. Academic Press, New York, 1969.

phenomenon does not seem to be documented extensively in the political media. One might wonder what effect, if any, false predispositions, about the abilities of candidates, play in the voting process. Moreover, the impact of nonverbal aspects, such as body posture and movement, have not been explored to determine how these variables effect the expectancy process in the political media. In the story about Clever Hans, we saw evidence that body movements were taken as signals to expected behavior. What effect do other nonverbal variables, such as costuming, cosmetics, and vocalics have on the expectancy process? This paper attempts to explore what role nonverbal expectancy effects play in the political media. To address this issue, I shall define nonverbal communication, discuss the origins of the pygmalion effect and self-fulfilling prophecy, describe the process of expectancy effects, and suggest how the process works in the political media (i.e., from the voters', politicians', and pollsters' perspectives).

# **3 DEFINITION OF NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION**

Sapir, in an early definition of nonverbal communication, claimed that it is "an elaborate code that is written nowhere, known to none, and understood by all."<sup>7</sup> Unfortunately, this definition is too simple. Another definition, by default, is to ray that nonverbal communication is everything that is not verbal. However, again we need to be more specific. By contrasting nonverbal to verbal we can obtain a clearer definition. For example, nonverbal communication is more primitive than verbal. Insects, such as bees, use motions of their tails to indicate to other bees freshly bloomed flowers. Nonverbal communication seems to be more continuous than verbal. We can<sup>p</sup> not communicate. Nonverbal is in the present tense where verbal can use past and future. Nonverbal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Sapir, E., "The Unconscious Patterning of Behavior in Society," in D. Mandelbaum (ed.), <u>selected Writing of</u> Edward Sapir in Language, Culture and Personality University of California Press, Berkely, 1949, p. 556.



communicates emotions; verbal communicates, primarily, information. And, finally, we tend to believe nonverbal over verbal messages. If a person says that he is happy but his facial expressions show sadness, we tend to believe his expressions.

## **4 ORIGIN OF PYGMALION EFFECTS**

With a definition of nonverbal communication in mind, we can now begin to explore the origins of the terms pygmalion effect and self-fulfilling prophecy. In Greek mythology, Pygmalion was the king of Cyprus who fell in love with a statue of the goddess Aphrodite."<sup>8</sup> Later, the Roman poet Ovid expanded the story. Apparently, "Pygmalion, a sculptor, made an ivory statue representing his ideal of womanhood and then fell in love with his own creation; the goddess Venus brought it to life in answer to his prayer."<sup>9</sup> In 1913, the term was used as a title of a play which was based on these figures from classical literature and mythology. In Shaw's Play, Pygmalion is a phonetics teach named Professor Henry Higgins, who falls in love with his student, a flower girl. In 1956, the play was adapted into a musical comedy and renamed, "My Fair Lady."

# **5 ORIGIN OF THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY**

Later, the term pygmalion was used as a metaphor throughout Rosenthal and Jacobson's book, <u>Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils' Intellectual</u> <u>Development</u>. In the now famous essay, Rosenthal and Jacobson reported the following findings:

Twenty percent of the children in a certain elementary school were reported to their teachers as showing unusual potential for intellectual growth. The names of these 20 percent were drawn by means of a table of random numbers, which is to say that the names were drawn out of a hat. Eight months later these unusual or "magic" children showed significantly greater gains in IQ than

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9 Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Encyclopedia Britannica. Micropedia, Vol VIII, 1981. p. 317.

did the remaining childron who had not been singled out from teachers' attention. The change in the teachers' expectations regarding the intellectual performance of these allegedly "special" children had led to an actual change in the intellectual performance of these randomly selected children.<sup>10</sup>

Although Rosenthal and Jacobson's results were severely criticized,<sup>11</sup> this study seems to provide support for the assertion that we not only communicate our expectations, but we often communicate them below the level of conscious awareness.

# 6 THE NATURE OF TRUE AND PSEUDC SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES

An important distinction to remember in analyzing expectancy effects is that between true and false expectancy effects. Although a number of scholars have discussed the self-fulfilling prophecy,<sup>12</sup> Rosenthal and Jacobson provide a thorough analysis and suggest a typology of relationships between prophecies and subsequent events.<sup>13</sup> An example of a false prophecy might be that of a statistically sophisticated roulette player. Most roulette players know their odds of winning, before they enter the game, and understand that when they win it is due to chance. However, if one roulette player, who consistently wins,





<sup>10</sup> Rosenthal, R., Jacobson, L., <u>Pygmalion in the Classroom:</u> The <u>Expectation</u> and <u>Pupil's Intellectual</u> <u>Development</u>. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, 1968.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Elashoff, J., and Snow, R., <u>Pygmalion Reconsidered: A Case Study in Statistical Inference:</u> <u>Reconsideration of the Sorentahl-Jacobson Data on Teacher Expectancy</u>. Charles A. Jones Publishing Company, Worthington, Ohio, 1971.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>See, for example, Miller, A., <u>The Social Psychology of Psychological Research</u>, Macmillan Co., N. w York, 1972. Also, Bradin, K., (USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of Psychology, <u>Issledovaniya v Psikkologii</u>, 1983, No. 2 (29). Also, Rosenthal, R., <u>Artifact in Behaviorla Research</u>, Academic Press, New York, 1969. Also, Jones, R., <u>Self-fulfilling Prophecies: Social, Psychological, and Physiological Effects of Expectancies</u>, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Hillsdale, New Jersey, 1977.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils' Intellectual Development, p. 7.

eventually believes his winnings are due to his prophecies--when, in fact, they are not at all related--he has made a mistake in his thinking. An example of a true self-fulfilling prophecy would occur when the relationship between the prophecy and the subsequent event is positive and due to the prophecy. An example of this is the tabulation machine story at the beginning of this essay, because a "real" change in behavior resulted from what the workers originally believed to be false.

# **7 HOW EXPECTANCY EFFECTS WORK**

Now that I have defined, discussed the origins, and explained the nature of true and pseudo expectancy effects, it is important to analyze how expectancies work. Three variables--senders' disposition, reinforcement, and correspondence bias--all play a role in the expectancy process. In the following sections, I shall pay particular attention to the nonverbal aspects of each variable.

### 7.1 Senders' Predisposition

Because we find ourselves and others in situations that have prescribed roles, we normally hold predispositions about those situations. Although our predispositions may come from a number of sources, three warrant special attention: stereotypes, hearsay, and past interactions. Nonverbal stereotypes can be found in many of the following ten categories: organismics, cosmetics, costuming, haptics, kinesics, oculesics, vocalics, chronemics, proxemics, and objectics. For example, we may think that a thin-lipped person is cruel, because our lips become thin when we are angry. However, an error results when we utilize a temporary emotional state as a basis for judging a personality trait. "Such a judgment implies that thin-lipped people look that way because they are narrowing their lips in anger continuously; but thin lips can also be a permanent, inherited facial

feature."<sup>14</sup> Therefore, a nonverbal variable may act as a catalyst for the expectaticy process.

Stereotypes may also come from cultural ideologies. Robert Jewett, author of the <u>Captain America Complex</u>, argues that many Americans divide the world into the Good Guys (defensive, clean, law-abiding, faithful, and humble) and the Bad Guys (nonhuman, offensive, dirty, lawless, intransigent, and arrogant).<sup>15</sup> Examining several of Nixon's Presidential addresses.<sup>16</sup> Jewett finds that these stereotypes do exist:

The Good Guys and the Bad Guys provided the appeal in the speeches defending the Indochina war, especially in the years 1968-1972. ...the North Vietnamese were "international outlaws," involved in "aggression across an international border," using dirty tactics like "indiscriminate shelling" of "civilian population centers," violating "the treaties they had signed in 1954," demonstrating the spirit of "intransigence," and making "arrogant" demands. The Good Guys in those speeches were equally gratifying. Our side seeks only to "win the kind of peace that will last," engaging in bombing for the sake of "protective reaction," offering the fairest and "most generous peace terms," respecting "scrupulously" the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos, and holding firm to faithful "resolve" while engaged in a "selfless cause."

We can see from these examples that many of the stereotypes are related to nonverbal variables. For example, we might pictre the good guys in white hats and being clean shaven. All of which adds to the imagery of the verbal stereotype.

16 Presidential addresses printed in the <u>DesMoines Register</u> on April 22, 1970; May 2, 1970; April 28, 1972: and May 10, 1972, reported in Jewett.

17 Ibid., Jewett, pp. 157-158.

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<sup>14</sup> Ekman, Paul. <u>Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage</u> W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1985, p. 26.

<sup>15</sup> Jewett, R. <u>The Captain America Complex: The Dilemma of Zealous Nationalism</u>. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, Pa., 1973, pp. 150–154.

In addition to stereotypes, the second source of a sender's predisposition may come from hearsay or what the sender has heard about a person or situation (e.g., I heard that he was a nice guy). Finally, past interactions may influence the sender's predisposition. For example, if someone was particularly friendly on a first meeting, we might expect him to behave the same during a second meeting.

### 7.2 Reinforcement

Once the sender has a predisposition to a particular person or event, the sender will begin to look for cues or reinforcement to confirm his or her expectancy. It is my belief that once an event has happened (and sometimes before the event is completed) the prediction may be reinforced in some way. For example, in the story of the people using the tabulating machines, perhaps the inventor nodded his head and smiled at each operator when they performed as he expected. In other words, the inventor may have helped ensure that the prophecy came true by his unconscious nonverbal behavior.

Reinforcement cues seem to be of two types: positive and negative.<sup>18</sup> "If a response appears more frequently when followed by a particular event, the event that appears to increase the frequency of a response is called a positive reinforcer (provided that its removal raduces the frequency of the response)."<sup>19</sup> Many animals are taught tricks in this manner. The trainer awards some type of food for each correct performance. On the other hand, "the relation between responses and the consequences of terminating ongoing aversive events has been termed negative reinforcement."<sup>20</sup> An example of this

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20 Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., <u>The Unspoken Dialogue</u>, p. 275

<sup>19</sup> Shames, G., Egolf, D., <u>Operant Conditioning and the Management of Stuttering: A Book for Clinicians</u>, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1976, p. 24.

might be where a bird is electrically shocked until he raises his head above a cage line. Once the bird lifts his head, the electrical shock stops. In positive and negative reinforcement, "the key consideration in both cases is that the desired behavior increases"21 It is important to note, however, that reinforcement is different than Punishment is defined as "the introduction of some response-contingent punishment. events" which tend "to interrupt or depress responses."<sup>22</sup> In other words, punishment is used to decrease a particular behavior.

Both reinforcement and punishment seem to have nonverbal correlates as well.

Burgoon and Saine sum up the behaviors in the following way:

Smiles, nods, increased eye contact, forward body lean, pats, hugs, and approving vocal cues may act as positive reinforcement; frowns, threatening looks and gestures, neutral facial expressions, reduced eye contact, hostile or cold vocal cues, and silence may act as [punishment].<sup>23</sup>

### 7.3 Correspondence Bias

Once a senders' predisposition is confirmed, one final step, correspondence bias,

remains. Jones states:

[Correspondence bias is] a tendency to assume that a given action can be explained by reference to a correspondent disposition when actually people with a variety of different dispositions would have behaved in a similar way. This tendency toward correspondence bias means that we fail to take fully into account the controlling role that situations play. Thus, persons expressing opinions under extremely constraining circumstances (for example, as roleplayers in an experiment where the experimenter clearly assigns the position they must espouse) are nevertheless seen to be sympathetic to those opinions.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> The\_Unspoken Dialogue, p. 275

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, <u>Operant Conditioning</u>, p. 24.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., The Unspoken Dialogue. p. 279.

<sup>24</sup> Jones, E., "Interpreting Interpersonal Behavior: The Effects of Expectancies," <u>Science</u>, 1986, 234, p. 44.

In other words, Jones is suggesting that even though the receiver of a message may be following a prescribed role, the sender assumes that the receiver's behavior is confirming his or her expectancy.

# 8 THE IMPACT OF EXPECTANCY EFFECTS ON THE POLITICAL MEDIA

Now that I have discussed the three elements of the expectancy process, I shall briefly apply this theory to the political media, concentrating on the voters, politicians, and pollsters.

### 8.1 Voters

To begin, expectancies may occur in our dealings with new technologies (i.e., computers, satellites, tape, disc, microprocessors, telephones, radio, and television). For example, we may think that computers are hard to use, and, consequently, when we approach one find that it is hard to use, because of our predisposition. With the advent of these new technologies, we have been forced to examine their impact upon us. Many articles and books have been written that are beginning to explore the implications of such technologies. Certainly, one thing is clear, these technologies are "a catalyst or intensifier of change."<sup>25</sup> Evidence of this change can be seen in what has happened since 1963: "television has become the primary source of news for the majority of Americans."<sup>26</sup> Television is also our source for much information about political candidates--the issues for which they stand and the images they project.

<sup>26</sup> Reported in Gregg, R. "The Rhetoric of Political Newscasting," <u>Central States Speech Journal</u>, Vol., 28, Winter, 1977, p. 222.





<sup>25</sup> Williams, F. The Communications Revolution, Revised Ed., New American Library, New York, 1983, p. ix.

Because of our predispositions, we have expectations about the qualities a candidate should possess, such as leadership, assertiveness; decisiveness, compassion, and integrity. beyond this, we also know that the candidate must cordinate his nonverbal actions to demonstrate that he posses these qualities. Notice that these reqirements support the findings of Jewett mentioned earlier. Of course, no candidate has all of these qualities; therefore, as Wayne argues, "by their ambiguity, candidates encourage voters to see what they want to see and believe what they want to believe."<sup>27</sup> The implication here is that as soon as the candidate takes office certain voter expectations may be broken. As Gronbeck suggests, when the candidate takes a stand on certain issues, his policies become less ambiguous:

In voting and in supporting candidacies in other ways, [voters] are projecting a kind of purified vision of themselves in those acts. They are seeing—or not seeing—in candidates what they would like to think they themselves would be like had they the good fortune, talents, support, and grit to run for and capture a public office.<sup>28</sup>

The point is that mediated realities, such as television, are self-fulfilling. They are "accounts of the way things are and conform to the pictures people have of those things, reinforcing not challenging the pictures in our heads."<sup>29</sup> As I have already sggested, in a self-fulfilling situation, nonverbal variables are present in formulating false predispositions or in adding reinforcement. Therefore, if a candidate can generate nonverbal actions that are coordinated with voters orginal expectations, I believe a higher election sccess rate will result.

27 Wayne, S. <u>The Road to the White House: The Politics of Presidential Elections</u>. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1981, p. 245.

28 Gronbeck, B., "The Presidential Campaign Dramas of 1984," <u>Presidential Studies Quarterly</u>, based on remarks made December 9, 1984 at the Fifteenth Annual Leadership Conference of the Center for the Study of the Presidency.

29 Nimmon, D. and Combs, J. <u>Mediated Political Realities</u>. Longman, Inc., New York, 1983, p. 2.

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### 8.2 Politicians

Now that I have discussed some of the issues that seem to be related to the expectancy process for the voter's perspective, let us examine what impact expectancies may play for the elected officials. It seems to me that many expectations can be and are fulfilled on a nonverbal level. Consider the following three examples:<sup>30</sup>

- 1. In 1972, many wanted toughness in a candidate. Ed Muskie cried. He was sentimental and violated expectations and he was never elected.
- 2. In 1976, we "wanted a folk hero to return morality to politics." Jimmy Carter let the press photograph him washing out his socks in a hotel room sink. He fulfilled expectations.
- 3. In 1980, "we would gladly replace Carter's sermonizing and vacillating with someone as sure-footed as Reagan if we were sure he'd live out the term." Reagan, "realizing that he was near the mandatory retirement age of many companies," demonstrated his vigor by chopping wood. He fulfilled expectations.

In each of these examples, however, it is difficult to determine if the expectancy process really occurred. In the above cases, the expectancy process requires that some members of the public start with an originally false premise about the candidate (e.g., he is folksy or he still has vigor), then have that premise reinforced nonverbally (e.g., he washes his own socks or he can chop wood), and, finally, attribute the actions to the candidate (he always washes his socks or he always chops wood), not the situation (e.g., ignoring the rhetorical move made by each).

In another area, Edwards has argued that the president must be aware of the influence of public opinions, which are obtained through the polls.<sup>31</sup> These polls have an



<sup>30</sup> Ibid., Gronbeck.

<sup>31</sup> Edwards, G. The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1983.

impact on how the president thinks he is doing or on what policies he wishes to pursue. But the polls also have an impact on how members of Congress support the president, in addition to the impact of party affiliation and interest group pressurs. Some members of Congress feel that their duty includes voting in accordance with the public's opinions. However, the degree of presidential success rate (i.e., number of programs passed by Congress) is mediated by the type of issue involved, the partisan makeup to Congress, and the president's ability to work with Congress. For example, Carter was initially inept in working with Congress, failing to brief Congress on policy before publicly announcing goals and programs. His success rate, though, remained higher than Reagan's, in spite of his lower popularity ratings. The point is that policy may be a more important factor in legislative success.

Given the above evidence, we can see the potential for an expectancy effect in the presidency. If the president thinks that public opinion is important, when it is not the most important variable, he may act upon this false predisposition. If many of his efforts are directed to increasing public opinion, then public opinion becomes an important variable. In other words, the originally false predisposition become true.

### 8.3 Political Polling

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One final area that I shall address is political polling. Many candidates for office rely on the services of consultants and data from political polls. Sabato has suggested that pollsters may try to "educate" the ignorant respondent on some issue and, thus, create an "opinion" where none existed before. Sabato states:

On many a prominent public issue, a shocking proportion of the public has no view at all; many people, in fact, may be only dimly aware of its existence. Pollsters had been puzzled by the wide divergence in public surveys on the U.S.- U.S.S.R.'s Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT II) until a New York Times/CBS News poll found that 77 percent of the respondents could not

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identify the two nations involved.32

This evidence seems to suggest that the pblic's opinions were created by the pollsters---either by the way the qestion was worded or by the nonverbal signals sent by the interviewer. Therefore, candidates may have acted upon a false predisposition about the nature of public knowledge of the issues. Again, a rather unimportant issue becomes important, because the candidate had inaccurate information.

The nonverbal aspects of political polling become evident when we observe how the polls are condcted---namely, by telepone interviews. Many of the pollsters get their data by asking questions to respondents. Rosenthal has argued that an experimenter can bias his results unknowingly, by sending signals to the respondent on proper ways to respond to questions.<sup>33</sup> Rosenthal states:

The particular expectation a scientist has of how his experiment will turn out is a variable, depending on the experiment being conducted, but the presence of some expectation is virtually a constant in science. The independent and dependent variables selected for the study by the scientist are not chosen by means of a table of random numbers.<sup>34</sup>

Rosenthal is arguing that, in most cases, experimenters expect a certain outcome and may unintentionally influence the results. For example, minor changes in voice inflection or reinforcing nonvocal noises may qide a respondent. Therefore, the biasing potential can be found beyond the way questionnaires are worded and analyzed; bias can be fond in the way the qestion is asked over the pone. If a pollster has an expectation of what the

32 Sabato, L. <u>The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections</u>. Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1981, p. 95.

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33 Ibid., <u>Artifact in Behavioral Research</u>.

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34 Ibid, p. 195. correct answer should be, he runs the risk of collecting inaccurate data. The point is that any elected offical or one rnninn false information. Therefore, this adds further spport that self-fulfilling prophecies may occr when polling services are used.

To curb the expectancy process in social scientific research, Rosenthal has developed several strategies that can also be used by the political pollster. For example increasing the number of experimenters (interviewers) or waiting until all data is collected, before analyzing results, may help reduce the bias of expectancy effects. Other suggestions include maintaining blind contact, minimizing the experimenter and subject contact, and employing expectancy control groups. Although many of the strategies are ideal in nature, they should be considered before conducting an experiment. Appendix A, B, C, and D contain a full description of Rosenthal's suggestions.

### **9 CONCLUSIONS**

Although expectancies are illusive at times and vary in degree, their impact is not debatable. A move to understand expectancies has been occurring in psychology. However, this author knows of little research that has been conducted from a communication perspective. Moreover, the nonverbal aspects of expectancy effects are not fully known. In this essay, I have attempted to suggest the process of expectancy effects and suggest how they apply to the political media. Nonverbal variables seem to have a significant impact on generating starotypes (which cause a false predisposition to result) and nonverbal variables also play a key role in the reinforcement step of expectancies. More investigation is needed before we can truly understand why "thinking life is just a walk in the park--may make it so."

# **10 APPENDIX A<sup>35</sup>**

## STRATEGIES FOR THE CONTROL OF EXPERIMENTER EXPECTANCY EFFECTS

- 1. Increasing the number of experimenters: decreases learning of influence techniques, helps to maintain blindness, minimizes effects of early data returns, increases generality of results, randomized expectancies, permits the method of collaborative disagreement, and permits statistical correction of expectancy effects.
- 2. <u>Observing the behavior of experimenters</u>: sometimes reduces expectancy effects, permits correction for unprogrammed behavior, and facilitates greater standardization of experimenter behavior.
- 3. <u>Analyzing experiments for order effects</u>: permits inference about changes in experimenter behavior.
- 4. <u>Analyzing experiments for computational errors</u>: permits inference about expectancy effects.
- 5. <u>Developing selection procedures</u> permits prediction of expectancy effects.
- 6. Developing training procedures: permits prediction of expectancy effects.
- 7. <u>Developing a new profession of psychological experimenter</u>: maximizes applicability of controls for expectancy effects and reduces motivational bases for expectancy effects.
- 8. Maintaining blind contact: minimizes expectancy effects (see Appendix B).
- 9. <u>Minimizing experimenter-subject contact</u>: minimizes expectancy effects (see *Appendix C*).
- 10. <u>Employing expectancy control groups</u>: permits assessment of expectancy effects (see *Appendix D*).





<sup>35</sup> From Rosenthal, R. and Rosnow, R., <u>Artifact in Behavioral Research</u>, Academic Press, New York, 1969.

## **11 APPENDIX B**

# BLIND CONTACT AS A CONTROL FOR EXPECTANCY EFFECTS

- 1. Sources of breakdown of blindness
  - a. Principal investigator
  - b. Subject ("side effects")
- 2. Procedures facilitating maintenance of blindness
  - a. The "Total-blind" procedure
  - b. Avoiding feedback from the principal investigator
  - c. Avoiding feedback from the subject



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## **12 APPENDIX C**

## MINIMIZED CONTACT AS A CONTROL FOR EXPECTANCY EFFECTS

### 1. Automated data collection systems

- a. Written instructions
- b. Tape-recorded instructions
- c. Filmed instructions
- d. Televised instructions
- e. Telephoned instructions
- 2. Restricting unintended cues to subjects and experimenters
  - a. Interposing screen between subjects and experimenter
  - t Contacting fewer subjects per experimenter
  - c. Having subjects or machines record responses



# **13 APPENDIX D**

# PROCEDURES FOR GENERATING EXPERIMENTER EXPECTANCIES

- 1. Ascribing subject characteristics
- 2. Ascribing experimental conditions
- 3. Disparagement of treatment effectiveness
- 4. Theory reversal
- 5. Intentional influence
- 6. Unintentional communication
- 7. Early data returns

